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THE FEASIBILITY OF A ZONE OF PEACE

Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas. In the 21st century the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters.

Alfred Mahan

P. R. Kendrick
May, 1985

Starting in 1964 there has been a movement to declare the Indian Ocean a "Zone of Peace." In an age when many in the world feel threatened by the potential of nuclear holocaust this is not striking in and of itself. What the Zone of Peace proposal provides is more valuable than the actual resolution. Empirically, it is obvious that nuclear free zones and peace zones have little validity. Historically, the weak have been vanquished by the powerful; their proclaimed neutrality notwithstanding. Consequently, a study of the peace movement in the Indian Ocean may be utilized to investigate why proclamations which attempt to restrict military involvement in a given region are unworkable.

A study of the peace movement in the region rapidly moves toward discussion of the military posture of the United States and the Soviet Union. Many littoral states argue that a removal of superpower forces would inevitably result in regional concord. This, as we shall see, is unlikely. This remote ocean is actually an area of high intrigue and endemic political maneuver. This paper will focus on the presence of the superpowers in the region, as well as that of China. Other western states with an interest

will also be considered. The prospects for peace amongst the littoral states (should the superpowers abandon the Indian Ocean), will also be examined. Lastly, some analysis will be provided which will identify major problems with attempts to proclaim any area of the world as a zone of peace.

It was first proposed that the Indian Ocean be designated as a zone of peace at a conference of nonaligned heads of state which met in Cairo in 1964. The proposal was made again at the 1970 nonaligned conference at Lusaka and a year later in Singapore. Later in 1971, due to the initiative of Sri Lanka, the concept was adopted as U.N. Resolution 2832. It called for,

> "The Great Powers, in conformity with this declaration, to enter into immediate consultations with littoral states of the Indian Ocean with a view to: (a) Halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean; (b) Eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great power rivalry."[1]

The proposal has been discussed periodically, but the last scheduled meeting in 1981 was cancelled because no consensus could be reached amongst the participicants.[2] (In fact, there was some discussion that India's detonation of a nuclear device might have destroyed the Zone of Peace concept.)[3]

Based on the Zone of Peace proposal, the Soviets and the U.S. met to discuss force limitations as late as 1978.

Although these talks will be dealt with later it is interesting to note that the two sides have not been able to agree on what constitutes the Indian Ocean.[4] The U.S. is reluctant to deal with the Soviets in reaction to their recent invasion of Afghanistan and other smaller, albeit generally nonhostile (if one ignores Cuban intervention), military incursions in the region. The Soviets are clearly concerned with the U.S. presence on Diego Garcia. To further complicate the situation, both major powers wish to preserve their traditional rights to freedom of navigation on the high seas. At the same time, the littoral states unaminously supported U.N. Resolution 2832. However, these states continuously curry favor with whichever major power is perceived to be most dominant at the time.

Prior to delving into the region from the perspective of individual states, it will be beneficial to attempt to define the Indian Ocean. At the outset it should be recognized that the concept of an Indian Ocean is really a convenient way to describe a large body of water.[5] Generally speaking, the ocean is located between latitudes 30 degrees north and 40 degrees south, and longitudes 20 degrees west and 115 degrees east. The littoral states surrounding this tropical ocean are generally poor and over-populated. "Politically, it comprises a complex system of states existing in various conditions of order and disorder."[6] A brief look at a chart discloses this to be the most enclosed of the world's oceans. The four entrances are via: (1) the Red Sea, (2) the Malacca Strait, (3) the Cape of Good Hope, and (4) from the south of Australia. Although smaller than the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, its size is considerable. For example, from Cape Town in South Africa to Fremantle, Australia is 4,700 miles.[7]

Historically, the region has always been influenced by sea power.[8] The sea routes of the Indian Ocean have played an important part in the spice trade, and the region itself has been an important source of raw material. From the 4th century B.C. to the 5th century A.D. Indian shipping was predominant. Control of the ocean then shifted to Sumatra until China became the preeminent power around 1200 A.D. The Chinese control was essentially mercantilist and her control ended with the arrival of Vasco da Gama in 1498.[9] Da Gama's arrival initiated the ongoing pattern of outside control. Portugal maintained control until the British became the mightiest naval power in the 18th century.[10] Both western forces maintained their positions of power by controlling the entrances to the Indian Ocean. The British presence was so overwhelming that the ocean was considered a "British Lake." On July 26, 1956 the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal cast grave doubts on the future effectiveness of any British-led peacekeeping role in the area.[11] In January of 1968 the British left the ocean and today two outside powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, vie for control.

The current situation is markedly different than that of the past. Prior to the British withdrawal the region was controlled by a single powerful state. Currently, the United States and the Soviet Union both project power into the area. Given the importance of the region other nations, including France and China, also maintain an interest in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, several of the littoral states are engaged in an ongoing military expansion, while others face serious problems of subversion, insurgency, and starvation. The impetus to establish the ocean as

a Zone of Peace must be balanced against the increasingly complex equations that continue to manifest themselves in the littoral states.

In terms of materials, the region has 60 percent of the world oil reserve. The littoral states also have a world monoply in the production of rubber, tea, and jute. The Indian Ocean trade routes are also exceptionally important in world shipping; especially for beryl, chrome, ore, antimony, asbestos, copper, columbium, lead, nickel, and uranium.[12] The vitally important ocean is not rated well for polymetallic nodules, however, "... as these occurrences may average less than what is generally stated to be a minimum cut-off grade."[13]

The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace is a concept not likely to bear fruit in the near future. Although this proposal has been presented several times, the strategic importance of the region as well as the political uncertainties in the littoral states make it an ocean with far too much significance to be ignored by the world's major powers. As will be explained, the Indian Ocean is not only of major importance as an oil and mineral route, but it is a hotbed of political maneuvering as well.

UNITED STATES POSITION

The United States established a permanent position in the Indian Ocean with the creation of the Middle East Force in 1949. Given the location of the ocean the only effective method to show the U.S. flag in the area was through the naval forces. The domestic perception behind the establishment of this force recognized that in order to be a dominant power and thus be able to influence local political decisions, a signal must be shown to indicate a willingness to support our allies.[14] The Persian Gulf

was the logical location to place the naval contingent because of oil production as well as its proximity to the Soviet Union.

Although our energy needs are not as reliant on Middle East oil as are Europe and Japan, it is projected that the U.S. shall have at least some dependence on this source through the remainder of this century. Consequently, U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf is there in large part to protect the eight to nine million barrels of oil that pass through the Straits of Hormuz and upon which our allies are so vitally dependent. The extremely large oil capacity of the region explains why Congress has always acted so favorably to the force.

The U. S. Middle East Force has been an expensive creation. Generally there is a command ship supported by two destroyers in the Gulf at all times. For every ship in the Gulf, it takes a total of two or more constantly enroute to maintain the presence. The use of Bahrain as a base is also tenuous. While there was a permanent agreement until 1971, the U.S. now depends on an executive agreement which limits a ship's days in port to a total of 120. (In 1971 Bahrain asked the U.S. to leave because of its desire to support the Arab Oil Boycott.)[15] Although the cost of maintaining the Middle East Force is relatively high, given the limited number of ships present, it is done to act as a check on the Soviet Union as well as acts of terrorism from Iraqui or Iranian forces. "In practice, the Soviets have been unwilling to risk a major confrontation involving U.S. Armed Forces, whatever their size, whereas they might be tempted to risk a fait accompli in the Western Indian Ocean in the absence of any U.S. forces."[16]

The current U.S. Policy is to supplement the three Middle East Force ships with periodic carrier deployments. Usually, a task

force will deploy to the North Western Indian Ocean three times a year for thirty-five to sixty-five days at a time. During these deployments, the opportunity to show the flag is utilized by making port calls. Additionally, exercises with Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and Australia-New Zealand-U.S. Council (ANZUS) Forces are conducted at these times. While the surge capability enables the U.S. to overwhelm the typical Soviet naval force in the ocean, the failure to establish a permanent presence has frequently been problematical.

Congress has never favored a large U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean. While support for the Middle East force has consistently remained strong there have been numerous opinions on whether to establish a strong U.S. presence in the remainder of the ocean. Prior to 1970 the U.S. was far too preoccupied with the Persian Gulf while neglecting the littoral states. The problems with that policy came to light with the Pakistan-India conflict in 1973. The United States and the Soviets both deployed large task forces to provide moral support to Pakistan and India respectively. However, "...the U.S. history of comparative disinterest in the region relative to the Soviet history of activity meant that the belated U.S. effort was much less credible."[17] Our lack of a permanent force created the dangerous impression with U.S. allies in the littoral that we might simply sail away when American concerns were satisfied.

As the U.S. Navy is not permanently deployed in the Indian Ocean, the small island of Diego Garcia has become a vital part of our strategy in the region. The advantages of a permanent base in the ocean are immense. In the first case a base provides important

logistical support. No less important is the impression that our permanent commitment conveys to friendly countries. Yet the creation of the base proved difficult despite its obvious practicality. When President Ford first proposed the establishment of the island base, strong congressional opposition was encountered. John Culver of Iowa, with support from Alan Cranston, Edward Kennedy, and Claiborne Pell, introduced the Culver Amendment. In this amendment it was proposed that no funds be allocated for the project unless the U.S. entered into Indian Ocean naval arms limitations with the Soviets. President Ford managed to kill the amendment, given Soviet and Cuban intervention in the littoral states, but this controversy highlights the often ambiguous U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean.[18]

Diego Garcia has been developed and is currently the heart of the U.S. Indian Ocean strategy. The island itself is fourteen miles long by four miles wide with an area of ten square miles. It is currently capable of providing anchorage for a complete carrier battle group. More importantly, the 415,000 barrels of oil in storage can support a battle group for thirty days without outside support. There is also a reinforced 12,000 foot runway which can handle the largest military planes as well as extensive communication facilities.[19] Its central location makes it the Malta of the Indian Ocean. The location is also relatively safe from littoral state air attack and immune from land intervention. Still another advantage is that the island is outside of the typhoon belt.

This is not to suggest that the base on Diego Garcia is not without liabilities. "The U.S. strategic axis in the Indian Ocean is centered around Diego Garcia. But this axis would be complete

only if South Africa (at Simonstown) and western Australia (Cockburn Sound and Northwest Cape) controlled the flanks on either side of the Indian Ocean."[20] Its isolated location also makes it susceptible to a determined Soviet effort to cut it off. Lastly, the fact that the Indian Ocean is the World's smallest does not eliminate the long distance from Diego Garcia to other areas in which the U.S. has vital interests.

The base is not the only aspect of U.S. strategy. Rather than keep a permanent naval force in the ocean, the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) has been created. While palliative to Congressional concerns, there is serious question as to the military significance of the plan. In theory, merchant ships loaded with military stores can be sent to a crisis area, and offload U.S. troops in the area who can supply themselves and be ready to intervene in a crisis. The ships utilized by the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) are controversial because they require a conventional pier on which to offload supplies. In a crisis that necessity may prove hard to find. It is also widely recognized that the RDF is not capable of supporting a force that could match that of the Soviets, although it might be feasible in a small scale conflict. The benefit of the RDF probably does not rest in its military capability but rather it serves U.S. interests by reinforcing the concept of commitment to friendly nations of the littoral.

While the advantages to be gained by creating a permanent force have helped show U.S. allies of our ongoing concern in the affairs of the Indian Ocean, our strategic position suffers from some dramatic difficulties. The U.S. presence is in part designed to indicate the importance of sea lanes to Moscow. Yet the U.S. has virtually no capacity to operate effectively in the Cape of

Good Hope. If the Suez Canal is closed, the Cape becomes "...perhaps the most vital strategic link in the trading patterns of the modern world."[21] Furthermore, the naval complex at Simonstown is a modern, well-equipped base which is capable of providing the types of extensive repairs that would be required in a war. To further emphasize the importance of this route, it should be recognized that 56 percent of the ships which travelled around the Cape when the Suez Canal was closed were owned by NATO states. That fact, coupled with the capabilities of the shipyard, helps stress the strategic importance of South Africa to the U.S.[22]

The importance of Simonstown is further explained by the need to refuel ships which travel via the Cape from the East coast of the U.S. to the Indian Ocean. If the Suez Canal were closed it is likely that U.S. destroyers would be compelled to transit the Cape during times of crises without supporting ships. Given current agreements, U.S. destroyers would have to go from Luanda in Angola (a tenuous fueling agreement) to Mozambique. That distance (2700 miles) would force a destroyer to drop to 25 percent of its fuel level when 50 percent is the normally accepted safe operating limit.[23] From a military standpoint it would be highly practical to use the base at Simonstown in a routine basis. While in port this would provide the added benefit of establishing a working relationship with the South African Navy. The insurmountable problem is that a policy of cooperation with South Africa would lead to an "...outcry from elements willing to sacrifice the nation's strategic interests for considerations of domestic politics and ideology."[24] It is interesting to consider whether the U.S. policy would change if the Soviets, or one of their

allies, closed the Suez Canal.

On a more encouraging note, the British have maintained an agreement with South Africa to utilize their facilities in times of crisis. In a very grave international situation it is conceivable that the U.S. might be able to overcome domestic opposition and use British coattails to gain access to Simonstown and its facilities.[25]

The Suez Canal is also a choke point of considerable importance. Currently, the only true military capability the U.S. has in the region is the Middle East force in the Persian Gulf. The significance of this force is virtually meaningless outside of the Gulf. There is virtually no U.S. air capability (limited air facilities are available in Djibouti) to speak of, thus making a possible move to the abandoned British sub base on Masirah a strategically important consideration. Located off the coast of Oman, an improved airfield on this island could provide air cover to ships going through the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea.[26] While air cover alone would not be effective in stopping Soviet military action, it is yet another signal that the U.S. takes the Indian Ocean seriously and, by virtue of a permanent presence, one available to our allies should they need military assistance.

It should also be recognized that the Suez Canal provides the Soviets a very fast route for ships from their Black Sea fleet to the Indian Ocean. Coupled with the ships they constantly have deployed in the region (an average of nine), the Suez Canal provides them with a means to rapidly increase their naval presence. They also have port availabilities in Yemen and on the island of Socotra. Thus, in time of war, the Soviets could easily

control the entrance from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. It would also be relatively simple to place mines throughout the Straits of Malacca, thus forcing the U.S. units of the 7th fleet to enter the Indian Ocean from the wide expanses south of Australia. Therefore, while the U.S. has taken some measures to improve its position, both the Cape route and the facilities in South Africa might prove crucial in a conflict with the Soviet Union.

Consequently, the U.S. position vis a vis the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean is less than overwhelming. On a routine basis the Soviets have more naval ships operating there than does the United States.

Ship Days in the Indian Ocean

Year	Soviet Union	United States
1965	0	1,100
1969	4,200	1,100
1972	8,800	1,100
1974	10,500	2,600
1976	7,300	1,400
1978	8,400	2,900
1979	7,600	4,200

The Soviets also have "...an advantage which the United States does not have--they are a regional, albeit not a littoral, state of the Indian Ocean."[27] The U.S. military presence is not a "paper tiger," but in a full scale conflict any U.S. units would be hard pressed to defend themselves unless a carrier battle group happened to be present.

which are nuclear-powered or employ nuclear weapons to call at her ports. As the U.S. will neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons, New Zealand has halted port visits for all U.S. naval vessels. The immediate reaction from Washington was to impose economic sanctions to encourage New Zealand to change its policy for fear it will affect the basing of missiles in Europe. Whether New Zealand's policy will influence similar behavior in the littoral states is open to question, but there seems to have been no reaction, favorable or unfavorable, in the region. The speed with which the U.S. responded to the ban will certainly send a signal to our friends that this kind of behavior will not be tolerated. Also, while the U.S. is gaining good will by sending massive amounts of food to Ethiopia, the Soviets have been slow to send aid and are viewed as violent aggressors in Afghanistan. Anti-nuclear sentiment may be popular throughout the world today, but it is doubtful that friends of the U.S. would risk losing her support, especially in light of recent efforts to establish viable long-term commitments in the region.

SOVIET UNION

The British abandoned the Indian Ocean in January of 1968. A mere two months later the Soviets commenced their first major deployment to the region. A Sverdlov class cruiser, Kashin class destroyer, two Kruppy class guided missile destroyers and a support ship all from Vladivdstok participated in a four-month "show the flag" cruise. The speed and timing of this deployment indicate prior planning on the part of the Soviet Union.[30] They have maintained a permanent naval presence since that time, their force generally consisting of six combatants and three support ships.

Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean is consistent with article four of the 1940 Four Power Pact Secret Protocol in which Russia stated "...that its territorial aspirations centre south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean...."[31] Although not generally included in the tabulation of ships, due to their invisibility the Soviets also deploy a large number of submarines in the ocean. The result has propelled the Soviets into a major force among many of the poorer littoral nations, especially Africa.

The most frequent justification for naval presence has the Soviets contending that a strong anti-submarine capability was, and is, required to offset American deployment of ballistic missile submarines.[32] However, the preponderance of her ships are anti-air or surface capable, suggesting that the ballistic threat might never materialize and, thus, they have defined other functions to fulfill; or more likely they used the excuse of strategic threat to enter the region in the first place. While the Soviet Navy has participated in a variety of activities in the ocean, the thrust of her efforts has been in assisting littoral states and showing the flag, further suggesting that the presence of force is political rather than military.

The U.S. has never revealed the patrol areas of her missile submarines, and the operating areas of these boats is one of the most closely held secrets. There are, however, some facts available which tend to cast doubt on the feasibility of the Indian Ocean as a submarine deployment area. In the first place there are no submarine tenders permanently deployed there. The nearest submarine bases are either Holy Loch in Scotland or Hawaii's Pearl Harbor, with permanent tender availability at Guam. Furthermore,

missile patrols are known to last approximately three months. As the transit times from established bases would consume a major portion of the patrol period, the limited time on station lends credence to the belief that the Indian Ocean is not widely, if at all, used by U.S. ballistic submarines. "Since they cannot be operating in defense of the homeland, there is no strategic threat against which to defend; the Russians must be doing something else in the Indian Ocean. As their actions to date have shown, this 'something else' is essentially political in character."[33]

There are several aspects of the Soviet efforts to establish herself as a power in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. wishes to offset the Soviets, and the converse is true as well. As mentioned before, the Soviets have a major advantage by virtue of being a regional power. While the Soviets have established a relatively large number of facilities in various nations upon which they can depend for support, they have never established a permanent base. Western dependence on bases has been a target of Soviet condemnation since 1964 and has proved a powerful weapon in the propaganda war.[34] While they own no bases, they did build the facilities at Aden in Yemen and on the island of Socotra, ostensibly for the use of the particular littoral states. Of course, the Soviet navy uses the bases almost exclusively. The Soviet Union is attacking the U.S. repeatedly for its use of Diego Garcia while they conveniently ignore any of their own facilities on client states' territories.

Russia, and her Cuban surrogates have also been quick to intervene in a variety of locations. These actions have further helped solidify their position with client states for the use of facilities. The Soviet Union is also friendly with India due to

their mutual distrust of the Chinese. Furthermore, "With the intensification of Sino-Soviet rivalry, the necessity for a secure, all-weather, ice free, east-west route has become paramount."[35] Russia, like the United States, is involved in the Indian Ocean for a variety of reasons; the foremost in each case being political. Russia, in support of political ends, has been willing to intervene in conflicts while the U.S. has not. As Krushchev said, "...Communists fully support national wars of liberation as just wars and march in the front rank with people waging liberation struggle."[36] This policy has tended to win support from poorer nations while driving most of the wealthier states, which, for obvious reasons wish to maintain the status quo, into the western camp.

The Soviets have still managed to assemble a variety of ports upon which they can depend. Although India maintains that its foreign policy is one of strict neutrality, it has certain arrangements with the Soviet Union that it does not extend to America. India and Russia have signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. Article IX of the treaty reads in part that the two nations "...shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of their countries."[37] This treaty is a mutual agreement to provide against incursion from their joint enemy, China. Soviet actions in the Indian Ocean are contrary to the stated Indian objective of creating a Zone of Peace. India tolerates the Soviet Union's presence in the ocean out of necessity. Hence, support for Soviet naval vessels would probably be difficult in the absence of a massive U.S. deployment, such as the presence of the 7th Fleet in

the Bay of Bengal during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971.[38]

After the United States began to develop Diego Garcia, the Soviets began to invest heavily in facilities at the port of Berbera in Somalia. Although they denied direct involvement for quite some time, it was apparent that they were constructing an immense shipyard. The capabilities at Berbera included port facilities, a barracks for 1,550 military personnel, a long-range high-frequency communications station, a dry dock, fuel storage for 170,000 barrels of oil, a 4,800 meter runway capable of handling all types of military aircraft, and storage for anti-air and anti-ship missiles.[39] The Soviets no longer have access to the port as they now support Ethiopia, but its construction is informative as it clearly explains how they intend to deal with Diego Garcia.

The Soviets have use of other facilities, none of which is as immense as Berbera, but which in total provide them with extensive capabilities. On a small scale the Island of Mauritius has allowed the Soviets to fly in relief fishing crews as well as providing support to naval shipping.[40] Although they permit both superpowers to pay port visits, the Soviets clearly have an advantage by virtue of establishing a precedent to do far more than visit. Also, there are the aforementioned ports in the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen and the massive sea anchorage strategically located at Socotra. At Dahlak, Ethiopia there is a small naval complex, including an 8,500 ton dry dock. The Soviets also have innumerable buoys labeled "Property of the U.S.S.R." in the Durban-Madagascar-Seychelles Triangle.[41]

While the Soviets have been quick to criticize the Indian Ocean policy of the U.S., they sided with America in failing to support

the Zone of Peace proposal. Both nations cited the imposition that the Zone would have placed on traditional international legal rights of freedom of the seas.[42] The interests of the two major powers in the region are too vital for them to withdraw. The U.S. will maintain its presence to protect oil supplies, mineral routes, and as a check on the Soviets. The Soviets will stay to attempt to win friends, keep the Chinese out, and act as a check on the Americans and to provide an all-weather east-west route. As was noted by Henry Kissinger, "Geography alone ensures that the Soviet navy will reamin in the Indian Ocean as long as the Soviet Union remains a maritime power."[43]

It seems very doubtful that either power would be willing to absent themselves from the region, despite the stated desires of the littoral states. Both nations have compelling reasons to maintain their force levels. Military force in the area can be used by both states to help achieve desired outcome. However, both countries are aware of the high cost of direct intervention. The U.S. learned this fact in Vietnam while the Soviets are currently learning the hard lessons in Afghanistan. But again, both sides are well aware that "the foreign policy orientation of many nations around the Indian Ocean littoral will still be strongly influenced by whatever country is regarded as the emerging power of the area; and this will be measured largely in terms of whose naval presence is the most pervasive."[44] From the standpoint of the superpowers it seems inconceivable that they would every abandon the Indian Ocean and leave it to the vicissitudes of local nations.

CHINA

Most studies of outside presence in the Indian Ocean area focus on the two superpowers. The Chinese are also involved in

establishing zones of power with friendly littoral states. Pro-western observers concentrate on Moscow's plans but often neglect to pay heed to Peking's interests and plans in the area. China attempts to reinforce the image that she alone is interested in the poor nations. There are wide disparities amongst different littoral states in terms of wealth; and these differences are exacerbated because some have oil which others. China aids those states with no oil and at the same time condemns both Russia and the U.S. as exploitative.[45]

The Oriental mind has always been something of an enigma to western observers. It is difficult to understand what China is really after. "While the Soviet Union is so busily engaged and is orchestrating a global strategy, the Chinese communists have been perhaps less spectacular but no less energetic."[46] What becomes evident is that the Chinese are pursuing the same strategy of intervention as both superpowers.

When the Zone of Peace proposal was first introduced it received rapid and enthusiastic support from China. As China was not then, nor is it now, a major maritime power, it had nothing to lose by supporting the statement of peace. Additionally, China received two major advantages by vocally siding with the littoral states; local support and a propaganda victory that enabled her to cover her expansion in the region. It is also important to remember that China has enjoyed the support and popularity of much of the Afro-Asian world for some time. While supporting "peace" and lending assistance to third world states, it has been China's position that armed imperialist states inevitably cause wars. Conversely, arms in the hands of the "oppressed" who decide to wage

the honorable fight for independence "...will constitute a force in defense of peace."[47] Clearly, "peace" is open to different interpretations.

At the same time China supports the Zone of Peace, the nation has been making efforts to increase the size of its navy. In China's view, greater naval power (and, therefore, greater presence) will help to develop more markets for Chinese goods, build socialism, and ultimately support and encourage world revolution.[48] For many years the Chinese army maintained complete control of all military planning but recent indications suggest the balance may be changing. "The Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) Navy now seems to have considerable influence at the highest levels of the Chinese leadership."[49]

The goals of this emerging naval force seem to be directed toward Soviet expansion. China perceives four major missions for the Soviet Union in Asia, which taken together are designed to encircle China. In the Indian Ocean region it is the Chinese opinion that the Soviets intend to obtain access to the Persian Gulf through Iraq and to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan (once Afghanistan has been subdued).[50] While these may indeed be Soviet intentions, the practicality of achieving these goals is doubtful. Whatever the reasons, China's naval capability continues to improve. Currently, the Soviets rotate ships in the Indian Ocean in the March/April and October/November time frame. The Chinese coordinate their naval maneuvers during these periods and conduct surveillance as well. China is not yet a blue water navy, but the ongoing building program is giving China an ever expanding naval presence with the stated goal of countering the Soviets. "In addition, the leadership realizes that to obtain credibility on the

international scene, China's potential enemies must recognize that China does indeed have the intention and capability to project sea power into the open-ocean arena."[51]

It is interesting that China as a strong supporter of the Zone of Peace is now addressing the need for distant power projections. Yet the fact remains that China has participated in militaristic behavior extending beyond revolution in the past. Although China no longer gives any naval aid to Tanzania, in the past Chinese money built up a small, yet effective, missile boat navy for that state. Also, when China tested her first ICBM (Inter-continental Ballistic Missile), the landing point was in the Indian Ocean near the island of Zanzibar. Although China presents itself as the protector of the third world interests "...the testing of her first ICBM in the Indian Ocean came under heavy criticism from the littoral states of the region."[52]

China's policy in the Indian Ocean is somewhat of a dichotomy. While frequently criticizing both superpowers for allegedly attempting to establish hegemony over the littoral states, there is no doubt that the main recipient of Chinese ire is the Soviet Union. Hence, China tacitly supports the United States and they openly agree with the U.S. policy of supporting Pakistan.[53] At the same time, China remains the only member of the U.N. Security Council that is in favor of the Zone of Peace. It seems likely that China's recent overtures to the U.S. are motivated by a desire to counterbalance the Soviet Union. Ultimately, China would prefer that both superpowers abandon the Indian Ocean, thus leaving the littoral nations open to receive Chinese style revolution. China has criticized both superpowers for failing to adopt the "no first use" stratagem of nuclear weapons, while stressing to the littoral

states that China does not deploy any nuclear weapons in the region.

When viewing U.S.-U.S.S.R. affairs vis a vis China it is wise to remember the Chinese proverb "Sit on the mountain and watch the tigers fight."[56] China will continue to support U.S. policy to some degree for the foreseeable future, but if the world situation should change in a manner which is interpreted by China to indicate a lesser threat, it is most probable that criticism of the U.S. will increase. Their policy in the past has been to practice self-aggrandizement and they will undoubtedly continue to do so.

China's support of the Zone of Peace has not been without qualification either. Delegates to the Peace Convention there have repeatedly taken issue with India as a co-sponsor of the U.N. resolution. As India is fairly friendly with the Soviets, and a definite enemy of Pakistan, this is not surprising. China has publicly stated that India's actions are motivated "...with the aim of serving the Soviet Union in its contention with another superpower for hegemony over the Indian Ocean and the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent."[55]

In sum, the strategy Peking has adopted will make them appear as a benign friend, regardless of what happens. With the exception of their ICBM test, China has studiously avoided taking actions which might be perceived as hostile by the poorer nations of the littoral. Peking strictly avoids intimating that it has any desire for hegemony and supports egalitarian goals. Their lack of truly high technologically advanced machinery has also helped them with the poor littoral states. While Soviet and U.S. equipment is more capable, it is also more complicated to operate, thus making the simpler Chinese equipment more valuable to backward nations. Lastly, China has created a situation in which they cannot lose

esteem with poorer nations. If the two superpowers do not divest themselves of their interests in the region, then China will be viewed as the benign, non-third-world ally of the downtrodden. If by some miracle the U.S. and Russia were to withdraw from the region, China could proudly proclaim that the pressure they exerted in supporting the Zone of Peace was a major factor in the decessions of the superpowers. In either case, China will have the support of the poorer leftist-leaning states.

INDIA

India, as a spokesman for other littoral states, has adamantly objected to big power presence in littoral affairs. Many have argued that when the British withdrew it left a vacuum that, inexorably, had to be filled by outside power. India rejects that analysis and claims that littoral states want and deserve self-determination. India has criticized both superpowers but has been mild in condemning Russian involvement. As an Indian newspaper editorialized in 1968, "The arrival of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean means that for the first time since Vasco da Gama, western naval supremacy is faced with a serious challenge."[56] India has spared no effort in justifying Soviet presence, although they make it clear they would prefer an ocean void of foreign influence.

It is argued that the primary basis for Russian intervention is to counter the U.S. ballistic missile threat. While the theory is highly suspect, it remains the predominant Indian explanation. Furthermore, they argue that the Soviets are present to keep the expansion of the U.S. naval power in check. This fails to account for the Soviet deployments, which came before the American deployment, but is consistent with their public and private

criticism of U.S. naval build-up.[57] Some of the Indian concern with U.S. presence seems detached from reality; "One of the long-term objectives of the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean is to influence the political and economic life of the littoral states by threatening them with a massive nuclear attack on their densely populated cities and newly established industrial centers."[58] Others argue that the U.S. desires to gain control of the ocean to exploit for itself the riches of the sea beds, while independent analysis suggests that the nodules in this sea are not rich enough to be commercially feasible. One concludes that these are persuasive arguments designed to influence the emotional support of littoral states rather than convince thoughtful observers. Finally, some of the passionate attacks on the U.S. are motivated out of anger because many Indians feel that the U.S. does not treat their nation with the proper degree of respect.[59]

India has repeatedly enunciated its neutrality. They also have pointed out that they have never allowed the Soviets any bases on their soil. One fact they neglect to mention is their willingness to allow the Soviet navy's vessels access to dockyard facilities. It does appear that the Soviets are granted more support than the U.S., but some experts opine that India would prefer that both superpowers withdraw so that India can institute its own form of hegemony. India also attacks the U.S.'s facility at Diego Garcia, fully aware that America would lose important influence among the littoral states if no permanent presence was maintained.[60] If the United States were to leave the ocean, the Soviets might possibly be willing to lessen their involvement, knowing that India was to some degree supporting their philosophy in the region.

The stated Indian objective is to help develop a Zone of Peace,

but they have at times expressed a desire to return to their historical position of power and turn the Indian Ocean into an Indian Lake.[61] "Geopolitical factors, historical lessons and maritime tradition all impel India towards developing into a major naval power in the Indian Ocean despite severe economic and technological constraints."[62] Partly in efforts to protect her large exclusive economic zone and to work towards becoming a more viable naval power, India conducted a 37 ship naval exercise in 1982. Additionally, citing its perception of an ominous 'militarization of the Indian Ocean', India's government has responded with a major fleet building program. In 1984 India began construction of a small aircraft carrier and should be capable of deploying a battle group by 1990.[63]

Ultimately, India's concept of a Zone of Peace seems to be more a desire to control its namesake rather than to foster a spirit of nonintervention and self-determination. The condemnation of the U.S. is quite strident when compared to what is said about the Russians; but if both superpowers were to abandon the ocean, that would best fit with India's ultimate goals. However, India would most likely pursue her brand of control of the region. Most states proclaim a desire to promote peace, but again it seems "peace" has many definitions.

AUSTRALIA

Sentiment has varied in Australia on the subject of military power in the Indian Ocean as a check on potential Soviet expansion. The experience of Vietnam was not lost on the remainder of the western world. Many were uncertain about the need to have military power for protection and Australians questioned the

necessity of maintaining men under arms, too. "As far as Australia is concerned, however, the climate of opinion is such that anyone who points to this uncertainty or suggests the need to build up deterrent forces in being--and in good time--is taken to be a crank...and is regarded with loathing and derision by the intelligentsia. This climate of opinion is reinforced by most of the media and by academia out of conformism and invincible ignorance."[64] The demilitarization movement in Australia, however, was never accepted by the majority. There was, and is, to this day, strong public opinion against the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. In fact, Gordon Freeth, a one-time liberal party minister for external affairs, was forced from office when he suggested that Australians not panic at the presence of Soviet naval vessels in the ocean. Although the Labor Government, which lost power in 1976, was critical of the U.S. naval buildup in the region, they continued the practice of close U.S.-Australian naval cooperation. Hence, despite some criticism of U.S. policy, Australia has never abandoned its joint commitment in the application of an Indian Ocean strategy.[65]

Australia has, in principle, supported the Zone of Peace. At the same time the Australians recognize that the inherent political instability amongst the littoral states makes them attractive to influence from outside powers. "The strategic position (of the Indian Ocean) must be seen in the context of an extension of the competing interests of the superpowers as well as the interests of other extra-regional powers including China, Japan, France, Britain and the major littoral and regional states which have the capacity to influence regional relations."[66] In a government report, Australia noted that all the littoral nations had supported the

Zone of Peace. However, only a few of them truly wished to see the superpowers withdraw from the Indian Ocean. This document suggested that most littoral states felt that if one superpower were present, it was in the best interest of peace to have the other there as well. More importantly, it was suggested that most littoral nations felt that a complete withdrawal of the superpowers would destabilize the ocean rather than engender an atmosphere conducive to peace. "A number of the littoral states harbor suspicions that a regional escalation of military strength would ensue with nations such as India competing to fill the vacuum and dominate the region."[67]

While Australia is a dependable member of the western camp, their analysis of the peace movement is representative of that of many of the littoral states. Supporting the Zone of Peace is one thing, but its inception seems unlikely if neither of the superpowers is inclined to leave the region. More problems are encountered when it is realized that the nations in question have not been able to consolidate their proposals in a manner which is satisfactory to all. Lastly, some states are pro-west, while others are pro-Russia. These nations view peace in terms of their particular political philosophy and seem unwilling to voluntarily abandon ties with the nation which is most likely to help them stay in power.[68]

OTHER NATIONS

There are numerous states, other than the superpowers, which might have a reason, as well as the means, to use force against a littoral nation. They include: India, Pakistan, Japan, China, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, the Phillipines,

Malaysia, France, Portugal and South Africa.[69] Nevertheless, other than the two superpowers, only France, West Germany, Japan and China demonstrate an active interest in the region. France, with its base at Djibouti, maintains the largest standing naval force of any western state outside of the United States. West Germany periodically sends a few ships to the Indian Ocean to show her flag as well. Japan is an interesting case given its overwhelming dependence on mid-east oil to fuel its highly technological economy. Japan imports 85% of its oil and 70% of its iron from the Indian Ocean. Also, fully one half of Japan's foreign trade utilizes Indian Ocean sea lanes.

After World War II Japan abolished her military at the insistence of the U.S. The Self-Defense Force replaced the traditional army and navy. In practice, this force is designed to help protect Japan from overt aggression. The force is small but very capable. The Maritime Self-Defense Force could, in case of a threat to Japanese lifelines, be employed in the Indian Ocean. In 1971 Japan supported the U.N. Zone of Peace proclamation, but increasing worry about the intentions of the Soviet Union has led to a quiet withdrawal of support. Hence, it is quite conceivable that threatening events could lead to Japan's pursuit of an active Indian Ocean policy.[70]

It is unlikely that the littoral states are ready to accept a Zone of Peace either. "As one participant after another pointed out, the littoral states have never looked at the area as a single geopolitical unit, and thus have no experience in regional cooperation."[71] Indeed, many of these poor states are vehemently opposed to any plan that could lead to their own demilitarization or nonmilitarization. The political instability of many littoral

nations encourages them to arm. Unstable, and often abusive governments depend on arms to maintain their power while more stable governments rely on weapons to protect them from avaricious neighbors. The Zone of Peace proposal was directed towards the superpowers. As the following table illustrates, a policy of arms limitations will be ineffective as long as other states are willing to fill the void:

Arms Transfers to the Indian Ocean Littoral and Hinterland States (SNMN)

1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
1625	2455	3355	4250	4065	5935	8180

Arms Transfers to Indian Ocean States by Source

USA	USSR	FRANCE	UK	FRG	DRG	OTHERS
11831	6650	1975	1525	755	335	2700

[72]

The U.N. resolution to establish a Zone of Peace received unanimous littoral support. Many of these nations support peace, but only in terms of the superpower they are allied with. For instance, many of the states see the Soviet naval presence as vital in the struggle to maintain peace. How else, they argue, could they be assured of protection from U.S. "gunboat" diplomacy? Governments friendly to Russia also appreciate Soviet naval presence based on the presumption that these elements are available to intervene if domestic difficulties threaten the ruler's vital interests.[73] Other nations, such as Kenya, support the Zone of Peace but see U.S. involvement in the region

as stabilizing. "Privately, Kenyans recognize the need for a United States presence in the Indian Ocean to match that of the Soviet Union.[74]

The littoral states are mired in poverty. Climate, history and social factors, not to mention corrupt and inefficient leaders, all play a part in the poor economic condition of many Indian Ocean states. While many outside nations provide aid, much of it being nonmilitary, little progress is apparent. Ultimately, there is not enough wealth in the world to substantially raise the standard of living for many poor countries. The east-west battle in the Indian Ocean is designed to encourage political alignment; the carrot being economic aid. Economic aid continues to flow into the region but an improved standard of living is an elusive goal. One way to encourage peace may be to simply teach people to glean satisfaction from the lifestyle available. "Experiments are being made in Indonesia with new methods of village education, and ways of developing a new lifestyle which will provide status and satisfaction without depending on western-level symbols and consumption. In the end, such indigenous initiatives may prove to be more important for the stability of the area than any made by outside powers."[75] In theory this might work, but the third world wants economic parity and would never accept this answer.

Littoral State Classification by Alignment

Pro-West	Pro-Russia	Pro-Chinal	Nonaligned or Unclassified
	Ethiopia	Tanzania	Iran
Australia	Jordan	Somalia	India
Israel	Iraq		Burma
Egypt	S. Yemen		Sri Lanka
Saudi Arabia			Mozambique
Onan			Madagascar
U.A.E.			Kenya
Qutan			Sudan
Bahrain			Pakistan
Kuwait			Bangladesh
Malaysia			Comdros
Singapore			Reunion
Indonesia			Maldives
Djibouti			Seychelles
N. Yemen			Maritius

LOCAL CONFLICTS

To write about local conflicts in full would require volumes. Yet these local wars illustrate what fragile concepts both peace and alignment are amongst the littoral states. Two examples were selected to highlight local conflicts: the Iran-Iraq war because it is ongoing; and the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict because it is a classic example of a local conflict with outside intervention that resulted in a complete realignment.

Saddam Hussein launched his attack on Iran for the stated reason for recovering territory and restoring navigational rights on the Shatt-al-Arab in order to guarantee Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf. Yet, from "...a geopolitical viewpoint, episodic fighting between the region's competing Mesopotamian and Persian powers has characterized the area's history for millenia."[76] Iran's Ayatollah has vowed not to surrender until, among other demands, Hussein is removed as Iraq's head of state. The Ayatollah has never forgiven Hussein for forcing him from Iraq while he was living there in exile. Thus, the two states continue to wage a war

in which thousands have been killed or wounded, with no sign that peace is at hand.

When the war first started, most observers felt the more militarized Iraq would win a quick victory. Iran has proved more resilient than most believed possible, having to depend on massive waves of troops to overwhelm the better-armed Iraqui fighters. "Once again, the resiliency of third world revolutionary movements is evident. A weak economy, massive unemployment, inflation, food shortages, internal unrest and invasion have swept over Iran like the Seven Biblical Plagues. Yet the Ayatollah's battered regime still stands."[77]

Perhaps a more poignant example is provided by the change of alliances in Ethiopia and Somalia. Prior to 1975 Ethiopia was aligned with the United States while Somalia sided with the Soviet Union. In 1975 the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) launched an attack on Ethiopian forces in an attempt to initiate a communist insurgency. The Ethiopians were forced to retreat and the United States stopped sending aid to Ethiopia. At the same time the Soviets supported the ELF as they wanted to aid all attempts to enhance the growth of Marxist states. The situation was static, with the exception of the war, until 1977. With Russia supporting both Ethiopia and Somalia, the latter recognized the possibility of seizing more territory and "...the Somalian government attempted to take advantage of Ethiopian instability by launching their July 1977 invasion of the Ogaden in a classic example of nationalist irredentism."[78]

The Soviet Union decided to support the Ethiopian revolution and halted all aid to Somalia. In 1978 Ethiopia, formerly an ally with the United States, was now siding with the Soviet Union.

Somalia, formerly an ally with the Soviet Union, was now being aided by China. The United States also kept its influence in the area by commencing an aid program with Kenya. Thus, a small civil war led to a complete realignment of big power support within two years.

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

The problems of establishing a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean are apparently insurmountable. The area is a vortex of countervailing political maneuver. Additionally, local nationalism and racism play a major part in creating tension in the region. The superpowers have displayed no indication to depart the area and China appears to be building up to make her presence felt as well.

In terms of China and the Soviet Union, the Indian Ocean is clearly the area of the world in which both states feel is the greatest opportunity for expanding their power. "The Indian Ocean comprises most of the third world, which both Peking and Moscow see as a most important arena of their struggles, and in which they have both sought to enlist allies against each other under the pretext of helping them emancipate themselves from the political and economic hegemony of the west."[79] Given the mutual historic distrust of these two nations, it defies logic to consider either state as willing to leave the littoral states alone. The doctrine of communism compels them to pursue their revolutionary practices with each supporting a different brand of communism.

The United States is not going to abandon the region primarily because of its importance as an oil and mineral route. America is also painfully aware that the Soviet Union land mass is quite close to the Indian Ocean. The invasion of Afghanistan also suggests that the Soviets are actively pursuing their goal to establish a

permanent base in the Indian Ocean. While this would cripple their argument against the permanence of the base on Diego Garcia, the Soviets have never sacrificed territorial gains for political damage. In fact, a major reason why the U.S. never agreed to arms limitations in the region was for fear of Soviet-backed revolution. While no Soviet troops may be employed in places like Angola, the Cuban forces present are clearly receiving their orders from Moscow. In that context, U.S. forces become a necessity as do arms sales to friendly nations.

At the same time the United States is somewhat constrained by public opinion. The base at Diego Garcia provides a vital signal of permanence but would not be large enough to provide support if the Soviets were to take a major military action. Yet, history indicates that the Soviets would be unwilling to take action against even small U.S. elements. Consequently, it is probable that the base will provide the friendly littoral states with reassurance about a U.S. commitment in an emergency as well as send a signal to the Soviets that America considers the Indian Ocean an important region.

The littoral states all raise a common voice to big power presence, but in some fashion most favor one superpower over the other. Coupled with that are the incredible problems facing the governments of the lesser developed states. Ill-prepared for self-rule, many nations were thrust into difficult positions with the end of colonial rule. "If the big powers are too strong to fight, the small ones are--by their very weakness, lack of cohesion, and balkanization--likely to be the cause or scene of all kinds of 'destabilizing' violence, ranging from delinquency, organized crime, piracy (with or without political cover), riots,

guerilla warfare, and full-scale replays of World War II tank battles and air battles."[80]

The Islamic states are also fractured by rivalry. Despite their stated unity and obvious opulence they are generally backward. Military coups, revolutions and political upheavals are common. Some Islamic states are pro-west, some pro-Soviet, some pro-China, and some are nonaligned. The end result is that the Islamic states are as likely to erupt in violence as any of the poorer littoral nations. "Ethnic and regional factors exert a divisive influence despite religious affinity. The conflict between Bangladesh and Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran, Iraq and Kuwait, Malaysia and Indonesia, and Pakistan and Afghanistan confirm this view."[81]

As with historical situations, areas with an absence of power are quickly filled by powerful states with conflicting interests. In the Indian Ocean the two most compelling interests are represented: economic and politico-strategic. Consequently, while the Soviet Union and the United States are not going to abandon the region, it is also highly doubtful that either nation will cease selling arms to friendly littoral nations.

The actual presence of the big powers is likely to remain essentially maritime. "Naval forces on two opposing sides will probably act as a restraint on each other. It is not true that only major quantities of force can have a political effect, or that armed forces are only relevant to a state of war."[82] Naval forces have operated very near to one another without leading to a confrontation. In the October 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict there were 70 U.S. ships and 100 Soviet ships together in the relatively

smaller Mediterranean Sea. "Indeed, it could be argued more plausibly that it was precisely this kind of naval stand-off that prevented a local conflict from getting out of hand, and spurred efforts by the superpowers to find a solution to the crises."[83]

Another factor to consider in the Indian Ocean is the peculiar position of the two superpowers. There is no doubt that they are rivals, but on a separate plane they also have formed a reluctant alliance. Both nations continually strive to improve their strategic balance while together opposing the Zone of Peace and working to maintain traditional freedom of navigation. In the Iran-Iraq war both nations are quietly waiting for a stalemate; in large part to maintain the strategic balance. These common interests further limit the possibility of big power withdrawal from the region. If they were to abandon the ocean to the littoral nations, the likelihood of a power vortex with South Africa, India, Pakistan and Australia competing for local hegemony seems inevitable. Lastly, "Some experts argue that the obvious point about the growth of superpowers' activities in the Indian Ocean is that the world is becoming, or has already become, a single strategic state."[84]

PROSPECTS FOR A ZONE OF PEACE

Having reviewed the Zone of Peace movement in the Indian Ocean, it becomes possible to analyze the possibility of this type of pronouncement being accepted in any area of the world. By reviewing the U.N. declamation, it will become clear that serious problems manifest themselves. It seems impossible that the Indian Ocean will become a peace zone in the foreseeable future. The proposal itself is filled with problems as well.

The first aspect of the resolution sought to render the Indian Ocean a nuclear-free zone. The proposal was obviously directed at the two superpowers, although to a lesser extent it was probably designed to deter any nation capable of deploying nuclear weapons from doing so as well. The definition of nuclear-free in regards to the littoral and hinterland states was not made clear. Specifically, is it the ocean alone or all the states that border it that are to be nuclear free? If it was to include the littoral states, India would certainly object as she is currently working to expand domestic nuclear capability.

Secondly, the proposal demanded that outside powers eliminate, reduce, restrict or halt further military expansion. Additionally, the proposal called for the elimination "...from the Indian Ocean (of) all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of Great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of Great Power rivalry." This last qualifying phrase seems to leave open the possibility that military bases and installations and nuclear weapons that are established by local states in a context other than that of Great Power rivalry will be consistent with the idea of a Zone of Peace.

It has been established that the United States, Russia, and other countries with an interest in the future of the Indian Ocean are not going to abandon the area. Furthermore, it can be asked by what legal or moral principle any group of states may attempt to assert an exclusive right to the high seas.

The problems experienced by the littoral states in attempting to force a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean are not unique. There

is no area in the world today in which there is no competition for control, or at least the right to establish a presence. Even Antarctica is soon to be hotly contested when the current treaty expires. Consequently, without a fundamental change in human nature, Zones of Peace will remain philosophical dreams.

In the case of the superpowers it is clear that they are unwilling to abandon areas perceived as vital to their own security. Given the complexity of international relations, it would be foolish policy to leave entire regions free to decide for themselves the future political alignment, or be influenced by other powers who are present in an area. Our age is no different from any that have preceded it, and trusting one's enemy is not a policy followed by nations with long histories.

A more dramatic indictment of the Zone of Peace movement is embodied in the false reasoning of the resolution itself. The assumption that big power presence is destabilizing is false. The superpowers take advantage of local politics and attempt to consolidate their positions, but they do not instigate the desire for change. Small states are as capable of waging war as large ones, albeit on a smaller scale. The possibility that nations will stop their efforts to gain more territory or expand their influence is remote, and no Zone of Peace is possible unless all nations abandon the option of employing arms to achieve national goals.

Lastly, all states with a naval capacity will continue to use that force in an effort to gain influence and protect their strategic positions. A naval force can travel anywhere on short notice, establish a presence, yet never violate the sanctity of another nation's territory. The traditional freedom of the high

seas coupled with the relative ease of naval deployments, assumes the continued use of this type of power projection. Political alliances, local and regional conflicts, and freedom of the seas combine to make the concept of a Zone of Peace unfeasible, if not impossible.

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[62]Singh, p.35.

[63]Michael Vlahos, "Middle Eastern, North African, and South Asian Navies", The Naval Institute Proceedings, 1985, p.55.

[64]Adie, p.87.

[65]Bezboruah, p.200-203.

[66]Australian Government Publishing Service, p.61.

[67]Ibid., p.137.

[68]Ibid., p.203.

[69]Miller, p.4.

[70]Singh, p.30.

[71]Amarie, p.6.

[72]Singh, p.20.

[73]Bezboruah, p.185.

[74]Australian Government Publishing Service, p.20.

[75]Adie, p.81.

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[77]Ibid., p.39.

[78]Bowman and Clark, p.90.

[79]Wall, p.139.

[80]Adie, p.77.

[81]Kerr, p.231.

[82]Amirie, p.78.

[83]Cottrell, p.9.

[84]Kapur, p.183.